over the last fifty years algeria has undergone major political, socioeconomic, and demographic upheavals. in population terms, the current situation and the concerns it raises are the very reverse of the position in the 1960s. despite the loss of lives during the war of liberation from France in the late 1950s until independence in 1962, the first census taken in independent algeria confirmed the extent of the country's population growth. Between the 1954 and 1966 censuses the country's predominantly muslim population had risen from less than 9 million to 12 million, an average annual increase of over 2.6 percent. at that rate, a population doubles in 30 years, and algerian researchers at the time were alarmed by a study by the algerian association for demographic, economic, and Social research (aardeS) which indicated that this growth would accelerate and might approach 4 percent a year by 1985. this would mean a doubling of the country's population in less than 20 years. despite these warnings, far from introducing a policy to reduce population growth, the algerian government adopted a discourse hostile to the notion of family planning, which was seen as imperialist in nature.
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although the census of 1977 provided some evidence for the alarmist thesis, with an intercensal average annual growth rate of 3.2 percent for 1966-77, civil registration data showed that the rate of natural increase began falling in the early 1970s. in fact, the predicted 4 percent annual rate was never reached. although officials and decisionmakers were fairly quick to understand the economic and social challenges posed by a 3 percent population growth rate, the fact that the growth rate was significantly lower than had been feared delayed discussion of the need to introduce a population policy in algeria. as a result, it was not until 1983 that the first national program to control population growth was enacted.
By the first decade of the twenty-first century, some two decades after the start of this program, algeria's rate of natural increase had fallen to 1.5 percent, despite the sharp decline in mortality since independence and the high potential for growth resulting from large cohorts reaching childbearing age. algeria's crude death rate had fallen from 21 per thousand in the years before the war of liberation (negadi, tabutin, and vallin 1974) to 4.6 in 2001 (onS 2004a) , and the crude birth rate had fallen from 47.4 per thousand to 20.4. Further, the average number of children per woman, more than 8 in the early 1970s (negadi and vallin 1974) , had shrunk to 2.2 in 2000-01 (onS 2004b) . ironically, the government still feared the consequences of unsustainable population growth and remained determined to reduce the total fertility rate. For the second time, policymakers were at odds with actual demographic developments, since by this time fertility had fallen to near replacement level. the 1998 census had even shown that fertility in some algerian cities had fallen below the replacement level as early as the mid-1990s, and the 2002 Papfam survey produced a figure of 1.4 children per woman in algiers in 2001 (mSP et al. 2004b .
Since then algerian fertility has risen, to a total fertility rate of 2.9 children per woman in 2010 (onS 2011a). this unexpected turnaround only emphasizes the gap between policy and population change. in algeria policy seems to have been applied in the wrong way at the wrong time, but this appears to be irrelevant, since policy has had so little influence on the course of events.
The decline in fertility preceding population policy [1962] [1963] [1964] [1965] [1966] [1967] [1968] [1969] [1970] [1971] [1972] [1973] [1974] [1975] : Government opposition to reducing rapid population growth as revealed by civil registration statistics, 1 algerian fertility peaked after the end of the war of liberation, exceeding 8 children per woman in 1966. this figure was confirmed by the 1969-71 multi-round survey, which recorded 8.1 children per woman for 1970 (CnreS 1974b) . the rise in fertility could easily be explained by family reunion after the war as well as by the euphoria of liberation and the return to peace. But since mortality was falling rapidly at the same time, the population's rate of natural increase rose to around 3.5 percent by the mid-1960s, one of the highest rates in the world at that time. in the opinion of aardeS, this explosive growth was likely to accelerate further: algerian demography was likened to "a sports car with no brakes" (aardeS 1968, p. 54) . the need for a population policy began to be discussed as part of preparations for the first national development plan. Given the cost of educating young people and the high rates of unemployment and under-employment, aardeS concluded that "algeria's economy is unable to meet the needs of all of its population and cannot form a sufficiently sound basis for proper economic development.… we cannot envisage without serious concern any further rapid increase in the population growth rate" (1968, p. 52) .
despite this call to action, the government appeared to ignore the problems associated with rapid population growth. the 1966 call of the national union of algerian women (unFa) for the right to family planning received some support from President Boumediène, who recognized that family planning was one way of liberating women and protecting the health of mothers and children.
2 the President approved the opening in 1967 of the first experimental center for birth spacing at mustapha Bacha hospital in algiers.
3 "Birth spacing" was the object rather than "birth control," because its justification was a matter of health not of population.
an aardeS survey 4 in 1967-68 revealed that public attitudes toward family planning were generally favorable, especially among the young, citydwellers, and the literate. the survey also identified some reluctance about birth control, largely the result of religious belief, suggesting that a favorable public position by religious authorities could have a significant influence on opinion and practice (aardeS 1968) . Such a position was taken in 1968, when algeria's High islamic Council issued a fatwa encouraging birth spacing, a radical departure from the ideology of the 1950s and 1960s that had been hardened by seven years of war against a colonial power.
in 1969, two more birth spacing centers were opened in other major cities, oran in the west and Constantine in the east (remili 1972) . But even as awareness of the population issue appeared to be growing, President Boumediène declared later in the year, "our aim is to ensure for our masses… a standard of living equal to that of the most developed nations in the world of the future… we do not accept false solutions such as birth control, which amounts to removing difficulties rather than finding appropriate solutions. we prefer positive, effective solutions, namely, creating jobs for adults, schools for children and better social amenities for all" (Kouaouci 1996) . meanwhile algeria asserted on the international stage its categorical rejection of any population policy, on the grounds that development is the best contraceptive. at the 1974 world Population Conference in Bucharest, algeria vied with China for leadership of the movement firmly opposed to the idea that reducing population growth was a precondition for development.
nevertheless, algerians who supported birth planning continued their efforts. training courses for public health professionals were conducted in the united States.
5 at the three major centers in algerian cities, birth spacing was being integrated into mother-and-child protection, and in 1971 the ministry of Public Health presented a proposal for a national birth spacing program 6 to the world Health organization. the program was officially launched in 1974, under dr. malika ladjali, head of the central office for mother-and-child protection, involving however only seven centers for the whole of algeria (ladjali 1985) . under the pressure of demand, this number slowly increased, although not until 1984 was even sparse national coverage achieved, with a total of 340 centers. this low-profile program, which was exclusively devoted to birth spacing for health reasons (Paulet 1994) , had only limited effect on the overall increase in use of contraception. Figure 1) . thus, the official position opposed to a national population policy did not prevent the start of a long downward trend. not only did contraceptive use increase significantly more than had been expected in the unambitious national birth spacing program, but the rise in the age at marriage, unrelated to that program, was the prime factor in the fall in fertility.
1975
in a society where contraception is hardly ever used and women are strictly kept apart from any sexual relationship outside marriage, a rise in the marriage age is automatically a factor for lower fertility. the mere fact of delaying a union by a few years reduces the duration of exposure to the risk of procreation and lowers tFr by several points. in algeria, the 1969-71 enSP (CnreS, 1974) and the 1986 enaF (Kouaouci, 1992) surveys can be used to measure marital fertility by age and compare it with the general fertility rate (table 1) . From 1970 to 1981-85, marital fertility fell 19 percent as a result of contraception, but general fertility fell by more than 33 percent, which can only be explained by the rise in marriage age. the phenomenon is even more marked, naturally, for the fertility of young women: while the rise in marriage age lowered general fertility by 45 percent at age 20-24 and even by 78 percent at age 15-19, other factors (including contraception) lowered marital fertility at these ages by only 21 percent and 12 percent respectively. after world war ii, women's mean age at first marriage fell to 18 years in the early 1950s 7 from levels around two years higher in the preceding decades (see Figure 2a) . However, the 1969-71 demographic survey showed that the decline in age at marriage reversed in the mid-1950s, probably as a result of the absence of young men because of emigration or the war of liberation. thereafter, age at marriage continued to rise rapidly, to 21 in the early 1960s and nearly 24 in the early 1970s. the trend is a broad one from the 1966 to the 1987 censuses, with a higher proportion of women unmarried at all ages: increasing from 53 percent to 90 percent at ages 15-19, from 11 percent to 52 percent at ages 20-24, and from 4 percent to 22 percent at ages 25-29 (see Figure 2B ). most of this change occurred even before a 1984 law established a minimum legal age for marriage (18 years for women and 21 for men).
8 the law only confirmed a trend attributable mainly to the expansion of education, which lengthened time at school and facilitated women's access to the labor market, 9 two developments that discourage early marriage. The 1983 ideological shift is not the main reason for the accelerating drop in fertility after much delay and debate, in 1983 the algerian government launched an ambitious population program. as we will see, however, the program did not greatly contribute to lowering fertility.
An ambitious program to manage population growth
as we mentioned earlier, the 1974 national birth spacing program was intended not to limit births but only to enable couples to space them. although it had no major effect on fertility, it helped promote a more positive image of modern contraception. Furthermore, by the early 1980s policymakers no longer feared negative reaction from religious authorities, since a new fatwa from the High islamic Council in 1982 had reasserted the lawfulness of contraception, on condition that it was voluntary and reversible. in political what occurred was more than a policy change, it was an ideological shift. in algeria's 1980-84 Five-year Plan, the population issue had been identified as crucial, since the country's potential resources were considered inadequate for the needs generated by population growth and increased by social demands. economic and social development was deemed to be impossible without some control of population growth (Paulet 1994) . as the State Secretariat for Social affairs wrote at the time, "much more than in the past, demographic constraints will continue to largely dominate the conduct of economic policy. action to actively reduce the birth rate has become an essential way of improving efficiency in constructing our economy and hoping to meet the population's social needs in a satisfactory and sustainable fashion" (SeaS 1983) . in February 1983, the government adopted the national program to control population growth (Programme national de maîtrise de la croissance démographique). in the same year, Information et education sociales, a review published by the State Secretariat for Social affairs, reported, "the population explosion in algeria has only just begun. most of it has yet to come. Shortly afterward, at the international Conference on Population, held in mexico City in 1984, the algerian delegation reversed its earlier position, even asking the international community for support for the country's new population policy, since it considered population growth as "the main obstacle to development." now the line was: "the repercussions of excessive population growth, both individual and collective, on the welfare and self-fulfilment of the family, the quality of life and social environment, and the ability of the country's economic fabric to satisfactorily meet basic social needs, urgently require widespread, concerted action to ensure the right conditions for controlling population growth" (SeaS 1983) . this new position, radically opposed to the one advanced in Bucharest in 1974, was issued against an economic and social background different from that of a decade earlier. in addition to the death of President Boumediène, now criticized for his "sudden reversal" at Bucharest, the objective of full employment by 1980 had still not been met. the country was under increasing pressure from all sides: housing shortages, unemployment, problems in the health care system, and the high cost of education at schools and universities. Population growth was blamed for the inability of economic policy to meet the country's basic needs.
the national program to control population growth (hereafter, the population program) was based on experience with the 1974 birth spacing program. its main agent was the midwife because of her strategic position as intermediary between the health care system (supply of contraception) and individual women (demand for contraception). emphasis was placed on training. in 1988, a contraception module was included in the initial training for midwives, and training courses for health care staff were held into the 1990s. Priority was also given to developing primary health care infrastructure. the number of birth spacing and mother-and-child protection centers increased from 260 in 1980 to 2,500 in 1994. Contraceptives were made available free of charge. in 1985, the program was publicized with a national awareness campaign, presenting clear messages publicly endorsing family planning (oussedik et al. 1988 ). However, this publicity campaign was not successful and was quickly dropped.
in the late 1980s, the population program was subjected to an evaluation, which determined that its performance was unsatisfactory. in addition to insufficient contraceptive supplies, difficulties were reported in management, information, and awareness. the effectiveness of the program was challenged (oussedik et al. ; Paulet 1994; mokkadem and Bouisri 1998; Benkhelil 1999; Boumghar 1998 ). Steps to strengthen it were taken in the early 1990s: in 1991, for example, midwives were authorized to prescribe contraceptive products and methods. Following the international Conference on Population and development, held in Cairo in 1994, the population program was extended to include reproductive health, a new concept based on international recommendations (mokkadem and Bouisri 1998), and in 1995 a national committee for reproductive health and family planning was established (mSP 2000). these steps were taken to no avail. within a few years the assessment was even more severe: the program should be totally revised. "Services were better structured under the birth spacing policy. once a population policy was adopted, grassroots work became less effective" (Belkhodja, quoted by Kouaouci 1996) . in 1995, an attempt was made to strengthen and broaden the population program. its national character was reasserted: the central government provided its organization, regulation, and funding. while the principle of voluntary family planning was preserved, emphasis was placed on improving access to family planning services integrated with reproductive health and reducing cultural and social obstacles to adoption of family planning. the creation in 1995 of the central hospital pharmacy (Pharmacie centrale des hôpitaux) was designed to secure the public sector's supply of medical products including contraceptives. Funding for contraceptives, previously part of the social security budget, was transferred in 1996 to the health care sector, with specific budgets allocated for purchases from the central pharmacy. a budget of 161 million dinars (equivalent to uS$8 million at that time) was allocated in the 1996 finance law, and oral contraceptives were exempt from tax and duty to lower their cost (mSP 1998). the government reoriented the program two years later, with population policy becoming part of a multi-sector strategy for comprehensive sustainable development. the program now had three basic functions: development of family planning, intensification of communication, and improved capabilities for the collection and analysis of demographic data.
The accelerating fall of births had little to do with the family planning program despite the severe criticism of the population program, its introduction was followed almost immediately by a sharp acceleration in fertility decline. the tFr fell from 6.2 children per woman in 1985 to 3.5 in 1995 and 2.2 as early as 2000-01, a fall of 60 percent in 15 years (Figure 1 ). in fact, however, neither government policymakers nor researchers attributed this fall primarily to the population program. the program did help to increase the use of contraception, from 25 percent among married women of childbearing age in 1984 to 57 percent in 1995. But this figure leveled out at roughly 60 percent (table  2) . the accelerating fertility decline was only partly attributable to marital fertility control; age at marriage continued to rise and probably contributed at least as much if not more to the decline. the rise in age at marriage accelerated in the 1980s and 1990s, from 23.7 years in the mid-1970s to 30.5 in the late 1990s (table 3 and Figure 2a ), an increase of nearly seven years in a little over two decades. Figure 2B shows that the proportion of unmarried women by age group rose most sharply between 1987 and 1998.
Contraceptive use largely contributed to lowering the tFr to near replacement level by the turn of the century. without contraception, the decline would have required a much greater rise in age at marriage. From 1981-85 to 2000-01, marital fertility fell by 35 percent, mainly as a result of contraceptive use. But general fertility fell by nearly 60 percent. the difference clearly results from the rising age at marriage. this difference is even more striking when one examines the fertility of young women: for example, for the 20-24 CaP 1968 , mod 1984 , enaF 1986 , PaPCHild 1992 , mdG 1995 , edG 2000 , PaPFam 2002 , miCS3 2006 age group, general fertility fell by 72 percent while marital fertility fell by only 28 percent (table 4) . we use Bongaarts's framework model (1978, 1993) to decompose the contribution of various factors to the decline in fertility (table 4). in 1970, fertility in algeria was lower than theoretical maximum fertility by 25 percent as a result of breastfeeding alone. this contribution has barely altered since then. However, the fertility-reducing effect of age at marriage rose from 27 percent in 1970 to 63 percent in 2001. the effect of contraception, only 3 percent in 1970, rose to 51 percent in 2001. in other words, before the initia- tion of the population program, the contraception effect increased faster than the marriage effect, whereas after the program began, the marriage effect increased more rapidly. of course, it was largely because its initial rate was so low that the contraception effect rose so fast in the earlier period, but this comparison still puts the specific role of the population program into perspective. although the effect of contraception was significantly less than the effect of age at marriage, birth planning did play a major part in the steep reduction of tFr from 8.1 to 2.2 children per woman over some three decades. Furthermore, it would be misleading to attribute the increasing use of contraception to the population program alone. although the program encouraged contraceptive use by providing unrestricted free access to modern methods (mainly the pill) for the entire population, women and couples nevertheless had to choose to practice contraception. that choice was in large measure the result of the transformation of algerian society brought about by three major and closely interconnected phenomena: the expansion of education, particularly for women; women's access to the labor market; and urbanization. these are standard features of demographic transition (Joshi and david 2002) and fertility theories (de Bruijn 2002), but are particularly applicable for developing countries, including algeria (ouadah-Bedidi 2004; ouadah-Bedidi and vallin 2006). these powerful factors in modernizing demographic behavior would most likely have caused algerian women to limit their childbearing even in the absence of the population program, just as they had begun to do before the program was introduced. this outcome can be seen, for example, in the even sharper fall in fertility in libya over the same period in the complete absence of government action in support of family planning (ouadah-Bedidi, vallin, and Bouchoucha 2012). last but not least, algeria, like many developing countries, experienced the severe effects of the economic and social crisis of the 1980s, exacerbated by the civil war of the 1990s. the "crisis malthusianism" (lesthaeghe 1989) combined its effects with those of the preceding development (ouadah-Bedidi 2004) .
thus, there is not necessarily a contradiction between official criticism of the program in the mid-1990s and the concomitant acceleration in the fall in fertility. what is more surprising is that in the early 2000s algerian policymakers continued to believe that fertility was too high and to call for a further decline in tFr when that figure had reached the replacement level by 2001.
The rise in fertility over the past decade despite the reinforcement of the family planning program of the two quantitative goals set when government fertility policy changed in 1995-a tFr of 2.5 by 2005, and 2.1 by 2010-the first was nearly achieved by 1997, a year for which the 1998 census reported a tFr of 2.7; and the second was achieved nearly ten years ahead of time, with the 2002 Papfam survey reporting 2.2 children per woman in 2001. despite this success, in 2001 the algerian government considered that fertility was still too high and posed an obstacle to development, nor have they changed their view since then (table 5) . in the first decade of the century, therefore, further steps were taken for reinforcing family planning. in 2001, the organization chart of the ministry of Health and Population was revised and a report on the demographic situation and trends for 2010 was submitted to the Council of ministers on the basis of the 1998 census results. to allow for the regional variations observed, a readjustment of the population policy's strategies and objectives had become necessary. a process of devolution of national population programs to the local level was started. Population Committees were formed in each wilaya (province) with the goal of implementing policy according to national objectives and local conditions (mSP 2003) .
in recent years the algerian government's perception of fertility trends may have been influenced more by such indicators as the birth rate or the rate of natural increase than by the tFr. the rate of natural increase is clearly the figure to consider at a given point in time to assess the obstacles that population growth may pose for economic development. with 1.5 percent annual growth, a population doubles in 47 years. But for that to happen, the rate must persist for at least 47 years, a circumstance that no demographer would reasonably have predicted in 2001 (ouadah-Bedidi and vallin 2000) . on the contrary, a continued fall in fertility below the replacement rate and consequently a slowdown in population growth were much more likely occurrences. this was clearly the case in all developing countries that had already reached the replacement rate after a rapid fall in fertility. as early as the mid-1990s, for example, the tFr was 1.8 in thailand, 1.6 in Cuba and Singapore, and 1.5 in South Korea. and in all of these countries, fertility has SourCeS: united nations (2001 SourCeS: united nations ( , 2006 SourCeS: united nations ( , 2010 continued to fall, while other developing countries have also seen fertility fall below 2.1: iran, united arab emirates, lebanon, Chile, Brazil, vietnam, and China. if the government continued to encourage birth planning, then, algeria could be expected to follow the same course. against all expectations, the reverse happened. not only did algerian fertility stop falling once it reached the replacement rate, but it has continuously risen since (Figure 1) . it rebounded to 2.3 children per woman in 2005 2.8 in 2007-08, and 2.9 in 2010. at the very least, this is yet another reason to reconsider the ability of family planning programs to exert any measurable effect on fertility trends by itself only. But what can explain this unexpected reversal?
as we stated above, since 1995 the contraceptive prevalence rate appears to have plateaued at 60 percent, and modern contraceptive practice barely exceeds 50 percent (table 2). in addition, calculations based on the 2002 Papfam survey indicate that the mean age at marriage fell by about one year, from 30.5 to 29.4, between 1998 and 2002 (Figure 2a) .
11 although we must await more detailed findings from later surveys, this sudden fall in marriage age may be the prime or sole cause of the rise in fertility observed since 2001.
we cannot exclude the possibility that increased marital fertility is also the result of the declining use of contraception observed in the early 2000s. the miCS-3 survey, on the other hand, shows an increase in contraceptive use between 2002 and 2006. if in fact the lower age at marriage is the only factor contributing to rising fertility, then this phenomenon might be temporary and the fall will resume when the marriage age stabilizes.
it is instructive to note that this recent rise in fertility occurred first in cities and was later and less marked in rural areas. Similarly, the rise occurred first among better-educated women and only later among the illiterate. the same social classes that once pioneered lower fertility are now responsible for the upward trend.
Conclusion
after long rejecting any idea of population policy at a time when fertility was extremely high and rapid population growth posed serious obstacles to economic and social development, in 1983 the algerian government established a national program to control population growth, at a time when fertility decline was underway. Fertility reached the replacement level early in the twenty-first century. the government continued to assert the necessity of pursuing its population policy, even as fertility appeared to be falling still lower. ironically, not only did fertility stop falling but it rose again sharply.
this account of mismatched correlation between fertility transition and the measures taken by the algerian government casts doubt on the ability of family planning programs to have a decisive impact on reproductive behavior. Clearly fertility may fall in spite of government opposition to family planning; the adoption of a population policy does not necessarily produce a fall in fertility, and its continuation does not necessarily prevent a subsequent rise. in fact our account strongly supports the view that family planning programs are in no way the key for lowering fertility in those countries where it is considered to be too high (vallin and locoh 2001; vallin 2011) . Such programs, we would argue, have never done more than accompany basic changes in attitudes, at best anticipating them but mainly providing some support for changes in behavior. the basic causes of changes in fertility, whether upward or downward, are to be found elsewhere-in economic, social, and cultural transformations in society. Consequently, the effectiveness of fertility policy depends closely on other policies directed at encouraging social changes favorable to reducing fertility: improvements in health, development of education, higher status for women, and women's access to remunerative employment and economic and social responsibility.
we do not contend that family planning programs are pointless nor that the algerian government should have refrained from establishing its program to control population growth. the program did at least liberalize and facilitate access to modern contraception, providing moral and material support to couples who wanted to limit the number of their children. we only emphasize that couples mainly reduced their fertility as a response to the economic, health, welfare, and cultural policies undertaken by the government.
note too that in the particular case of algeria, the fall in fertility was largely due to a rise in the age at marriage that was not encouraged by any policy. at present young adults, especially young women, pay a psychological price for this trend toward later marriage. Young people in algeria must cope with the consequences of the demographic upheavals algeria has undergone in the past forty years. not only do they confront high levels of unemployment and housing shortages, but, unable to marry, they are constrained by the social norms and taboos that forbid sexual relations outside marriage. of course, this taboo is often evaded, but often at high personal and social cost. 3 the center was also called CPmi (center for the protection of mother and child). 7 this figure for mean age at first marriage, based on the 1966 census (vallin 1973) , is calculated by applying Hajnal's method (1953) to the proportions of unmarried women. it is the only method usable for much of the period studied in this article. unfortunately, mean age at first marriage calculated in this way depicts a reality much earlier than the observation date, since it covers marriages occurring in the previous 30 years. By making special use of the individual data from the 1998 census, we have observed that the weighted mean of actual year of marriage occurred 13.5 years before the census. Consequently, the result taken from the 1966 census is attributed to 1952-53, and so on. 8 under sharia law the legal age had been puberty. a 1963 law first set it at age 16 for women and age 18 for men (Khemisti law). the 1984 law was then amended in 2005 by a decree setting the minimum legal age at 19 for both sexes.
9 although access to the labor market does not necessarily mean finding gainful employment, women routinely become jobseekers on completing or interrupting their education.
10 interview, Belkhodja, and with mustapha Benzine, director of the Social Studies division of the algerian national economic and Social Council (CneS) 2006.
11 unfortunately, the comparison of figures taken from two different sources (a census and a demographic survey) may produce a large margin of error. However, the comprehensive data on weddings provided by civil registration support the assumed fall in age at marriage, since the annual crude marriage rate (all ages) nearly doubled from 2000 to 2010, which could hardly occur without a lowering of the marriage age.
